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Chapter 10
Effectiveness Evaluation About the Tsunami
Measures Taken at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS
Masato Mizokami, Takashi Uemura, Yoshihiro Oyama,
Yasunori Yamanaka, and Shinichi Kawamura
Abstract All of the nuclear power stations of TEPCO had experienced huge exter-
nal events. One of which is the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-Oki earthquake in 2007 at
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station (NPS), and the other is the Great East
Japan Earthquake in 2011 at Fukushima Daiichi NPS and Fukushima Daini NPS.
Especially, the Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–3 experienced severe accident, since
prolonged station blackout (SBO) and loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS) were
induced by the huge tsunami which was generated by the Great East Japan Earth-
quake. The most important lesson learned was that the defense-in-depth for external
event was insufficient. Therefore, we are implementing many safety enhancement
measures for tsunami in our Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station. Thus, in
order to confirm the effectiveness of these safety enhancement measures, TEPCO
performed tsunami PRA studies. The studies were conducted in accordance with
“The Standard of Tsunami Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for nuclear power
plants” [1] established by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan. TEPCO conducted
two state (the state before the implementation of accident management
(AM) measures and the state at the present) evaluations to confirm the effectiveness
of the safety enhancement measures. In this evaluation, TEPCO were able to confirm
the effectiveness of safety enhancement measures carried out towards plant vulner-
abilities that were found before these measures were implemented.
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All of the nuclear power stations of TEPCO had experienced huge external events.
One of which is the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-Oki earthquake in 2007 at Kashiwazaki-
Kariwa Nuclear Power Station (NPS), and the other is the Great East Japan
Earthquake in 2011 at Fukushima Daiichi NPS and Fukushima Daini NPS. Espe-
cially, the Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–3 experienced severe accident, since
prolonged station blackout (SBO) and loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS) were
induced by the huge tsunami which was generated by the Great East Japan
Earthquake. One of the lessons learned is “defense-in-depth for tsunami was
insufficient.” In terms of safety enhancement of nuclear power plant from this
lesson, countermeasure for each layer of defense-in-depth against tsunami is
enhanced in the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS. Then, we perform tsunami PRA in
order to understand plant vulnerability and to check validity of deployed counter-
measure against tsunami for Unit 7 (ABWR) of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS. This
paper describes the evaluation result completed by applying to states before and
after the implementation of the tsunami countermeasures.
10.2 Outline of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power
Station
The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (see Fig. 10.1) is located in Kariwa
Village and Kashiwazaki City in Niigata Prefecture facing on the coast of the Japan
Sea, and seven nuclear reactors (Unit 1–5: BWR5, Unit 6, 7: ABWR, a total of
8212 MWe) are built.
The ground elevation is T.P. 5 m (Tokyo Peil: sea-level of Tokyo Bay) at the
north side (Units 1–5) and T.P. 12 m at the south side (Units 5–7).
South Side (unit 1 –4) North Side (unit 5 –7)
Fig. 10.1 Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS
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10.3 Tsunami PRA for Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear
Power Station
In Japan, from the lesson of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, development of
tsunami PRA method was accelerated immediately after the accident, and Atomic
Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) issued tsunami PRA guideline in February 2012
[1]. Then, TEPCO started to perform tsunami PRA to evaluate the effectiveness of
tsunami countermeasures. In the state before the implementation of tsunami coun-
termeasures, since there is no means to prevent flooding to building and function
failure of important equipment assuming generation of tsunami exceeding the 1st
floor height of the building, each flooding propagation evaluation and fragility
evaluation is done with a simple method, and the core damage frequency (CDF)
for each accident sequence is calculated.
10.3.1 Tsunami Hazard Evaluation
Tsunami hazard for the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS is evaluated based on the
“method of probabilistic tsunami hazard analysis” [2] issued in 2009 by the Japan
Society of Civil Engineers (JSCE). However, the occurrence frequency and the
scale of earthquake, assuming multi-segment rupture of the faults which is the latest
knowledge acquired in the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake, are
also taken into consideration.
10.3.1.1 Tsunami Source Model
Regarding the tsunami-induced source area, the tsunami induced by earthquake,
originated by faults which exist in the area, is determined in terms of whether they
have significant influence on the tsunami hazard of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS.
As a result, the following areas are selected:
1. The fault which is considered in seismic design and is identified by geological
survey, etc.
2. The fault which is unidentified by investigation, but indicated by an external
organization (epicenter at coast of the Niigata southwest earthquake).
3. The east edge of Japan Sea; Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS is considered to be
affected significantly when tsunami occurs there.
Regarding these tsunami occurrence areas, the tsunami occurrence scenario is
created by setting up the magnitude range and the earthquake recurrence interval.
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10.3.1.2 Uncertainty
Random uncertainty in a numerical computation model and epistemic uncertainty
regarding some issues such as the existence of active fault and magnitude range,
etc., are considered in tsunami hazard evaluation. Epistemic uncertainty is dealt
with as number of branch of tsunami occurrence scenario, and given weighting to
each scenario. Weights of discrete branches that represent alternative hypotheses
and interpretations were determined by the JSCE guideline basically. In this
evaluation, the magnitude range, earthquake occurrence probability, probability
of multi-segment rupture of the faults, and probability distributions of random
uncertainty are taken into consideration.
10.3.1.3 Hazard Curve
The annual probability of exceedance of tsunami wave height is created for each
tsunami occurrence scenario defined in Sects. 11.3.1.1 and 11.3.1.2. Next, for each
curve, with consideration for the weighting corresponding to each scenario, statis-
tical processing is performed, and hazard curve is created for weighted average as
arithmetic average for weighted accumulation sum as fractal curve. As mentioned
above, the tsunami hazard curve (tsunami run-up area at the north side) is shown in
Fig. 10.2. In evaluation of the state before the implementation of tsunami counter-
measures, when tsunami exceeds height of the 1st floor of building, it is simply
assumed that flooding in the building occurs and equipment function is lost, and it





































Fig. 10.2 Tsunami hazard curve
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height is T.P.12.3 m, when the tsunami beyond this height strikes, it is evaluated as
core damage occurs.
10.3.2 Tsunami Fragility Evaluation
Regarding influence of tsunami on equipment, damage by flooding and by tsunami
wave force is considered. Regarding equipment on yard and door on outer wall of
the buildings such as yard tank, yard watertight door, etc., the failure probability
against tsunami wave force is set by flooding depth based on tsunami run-up
analysis result. Regarding equipment and door inside building, the damage proba-
bility is set by flooding propagation analysis result for building. Regarding tsunami
run-up analysis, it is performed for multi-case of tsunami height. For each case,
fragility curve is evaluated from the equipment damage probability with consider-
ation for the uncertainty in the flooding depth of the installation location for each
equipment. The main assumptions in the fragility evaluation are shown below:
1. Embankment, tidal wall
When tsunami exceeds the height of the embankment or tidal wall, these failures
are assumed.
2. Watertight door, general door
Regarding protection doors installed on building outer wall, fragility evaluation
is conservatively performed with consideration for tsunami wave force.
3. Yard tanks (light oil tank, pure water storage tank)
Since these tanks are on the ground, damage evaluation by tsunami wave force is
performed, but evaluation for flooding and function affected by water level by
submersion is also performed.
4. Fire protection system piping
Fracture evaluation is performed for bending load of piping changed by tsunami
wave force. Branch piping which has high failure possibility is also taken into
consideration.
5. Equipment in building (reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC), power
panel, etc.)
Flooding propagation evaluation in building is performed, and when the
concerned equipment and required support system are inundated, the function
failures are assumed.
However, in evaluation of the state before the implementation of tsunami
countermeasures, fragility evaluation with consideration for uncertainty is not
performed, but method that the events induced by the tsunami of a certain height
are deterministically evaluated is adopted.
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10.3.3 Accident Scenario Identification
10.3.3.1 The State Before the Implementation of Tsunami
Countermeasures
At the state before the implementation of tsunami countermeasures, it is assumed
accident scenarios considering flooding according to the tsunami wave height. In
addition, if the tsunami height is below the site level (T.P. 12 m), it is assumed that
inundation starts via maintenance hatch (T.P. 3.5 m) in the heat exchanger area in
the turbine building when tsunami height exceeds T.P. 3.5 m. Also, it is conserva-
tively assumed that all the buildings connected to turbine building are flooded to the
tsunami height.
0. Tsunami height between T.P. 4.2 m and T.P. 4.8 m
The support system (e.g., reactor cooling water system (RCW) pumps, reactor
sea water system (RSW) pumps) is located in basement 1st floor of turbine
building (T/B). When tsunami height exceeds T.P. 4.2 m, the support system is
flooded, and it causes LUHS by the function failure. In addition, non-safety-
related metal-clad switch gear (M/C) in basement 2nd floor of T/B is also
flooded.
1. Tsunami height between T.P. 4.8 m and T.P. 6.5 m
Emergency M/C in basement floor of reactor building (R/B) is flooded and lost
its function. It causes SBO by the function failure of emergency M/C and non-
safety-related M/C, because it cannot be powered by off-site power and emer-
gency diesel generators (D/Gs).
2. Tsunami height between T.P. 6.5 m and T.P. 12.3 m
DC power panel in the basement floor of control building (C/B) is flooded and
loses its function. It causes loss of DC power.
3. Tsunami height exceeding T.P. 12.3 m
Tsunami runs up to the site level, low-voltage start-up transformer located at the
site level is flooded and loses its function, and inundation into the main buildings
occurs via entrance of each building.
10.3.3.2 The State After the Implementation of Tsunami Measures
Using the results of tsunami fragility analysis as a reference, initiating events which
are induced by tsunami are adopted and accident scenario analysis is conducted.
The extracted initiating events are shown below:
1. Loss of off-site power (LOOP)
• Flooding of low-voltage start-up transformer
2. Loss of function of emergency D/G
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• Flooding of emergency D/G(A,B,C) by inundation of R/B
• Fuel transport failure by damage of light oil tank
• Fuel transport failure by damage of fuel transport pump
• Operation failure of emergency D/Gs operation failure by loss of support
system function by T/B flooding
• Flooding of emergency power panel room in R/B
3. Loss of ultimate heat sink
• Loss of support system function by T/B flooding
• Loss of support system function by D/G failure (in case of LOOP)
4. Loss of instrumentation and control system function
• Flooding of main control room (MCR) in C/B
• Flooding of DC power panel in C/B
Plant walkdown in R/B, T/B, and yard is implemented by analysts and designers
to confirm the result of fragility analysis and assumed accident scenario. As a result,
validity of the fragility and scenario is checked.
10.3.4 Accident Sequence Evaluation
10.3.4.1 The State Before the Implementation of Tsunami
Countermeasures
Accident scenario changes according to tsunami height. So, initiating events and
credited mitigation systems are changed as well.
1. Tsunami height between T.P. 4.2 m and T.P. 4.8 m
Initiating event is set as LUHS. In identified accident scenario, the relief valve
function of SRV and RCIC are credited as mitigation systems. Event tree is
shown in Fig. 10.3. CDF for this tsunami height is calculated as 8.8E-5(/RY),
and dominant sequence is TQUV (transient with loss of all ECCS injections).
2. Tsunami height between T.P. 4.8 m and T.P. 6.5 m
Initiating event is set as LUHS and SBO. Credited mitigation system is the same
as (1). Event tree is shown in Fig. 10.4. CDF for this tsunami height is calculated
as 1.0E-4(/RY) and dominant sequence is TQUV.
3. Tsunami height exceeding T.P. 6.5 m
Initiating event is set as LUHS, SBO, and loss of DC power. No credited
mitigation system is set because it is assumed loss of DC power. Event tree is
shown in Fig. 10.5. CDF for this tsunami height is calculated as 2.5E-5 (/RY),
and dominant sequence is TBD (transient with loss of all AC and DC powers).
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Tsunami PRA results at the state before the implementation of countermeasures
is shown in Fig. 10.6. Total CDF is calculated as 2.1E-4(/RY) in average value. As







TW: Transient with loss of decay heat removal
ൺ Containment vessel failure before core damage
TQUV: Transient with loss of all high pressure and low pressure ECCS injections.
























TW: Transient with loss of decay heat removal
ൺ Containment vessel failure before core damage
TQUV: Transient with loss of all high pressure and low pressure ECCS injections.


















Fig. 10.4 Event tree (tsunami height T.P. 4.8 m–6.5 m)






























TQUV: Transient with loss of all high pressure and low pressure ECCS injections
TBD: Transient with loss of all AC & DC powers
Fig. 10.6 Contribution of each accident sequences for CDF in tsunami PRA (the state before the
implementation of tsunami countermeasures)
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10.3.4.2 The State After the Implementation of Tsunami
Countermeasures
Based on the result of tsunami fragility analysis, in the accident sequence analysis,
failure rate which is relevant to initiating events or equipment relevant to credited
mitigation system is calculated, and combination of tsunami height and damaged
equipment is considered.
Regarding the accident sequence analysis, tsunami initiating hierarchy event tree
is constructed. In this event tree, yard equipment whose failure is directly connected
to the initiating event is set as heading. The hierarchy event tree is shown in
Fig. 10.7. In event tree for each initiating event which is expanded from the
hierarchy event tree, yard equipment which is not considered as heading is set as
mitigation systems.
The outline of accident sequence analysis is described below:
1. Tsunami height between T.P. 15 m and T.P. 17 m
Because, as shown by the fragility analysis result, the watertight doors of each
building are not broken by tsunami of this height, inundation into the buildings
does not occur, but the fuel transport pumps on yard are destroyed by tsunami. In
this state, random failure of temporary oil transport pump which is installed
thereafter is assumed. Because of this, all emergency D/Gs lose their function,
and it causes the SBO.
2. Tsunami height between T.P. 17 m and T.P. 18 m
Because, as shown by the fragility analysis result, the watertight doors of T/B
and R/B are broken by tsunami of this height, inundation into the T/B and R/B
























To LOOP: To child event tree for initiator event "Loss of Offsite Power", (the CDF of this sequence is 7.1E-11)
To SBO1: To child event tree for initiator event "Station Black Out with loss of emergency DC", (CDF: 2.8E-09)
To SBO2: To child event tree for initiator event "Station Black Out with loss of support system", (CDF:1.2E-09)
TBU: Transient with loss of all AC powers and ECCS(RCIC) injections
TBD: Transient with loss of all AC & DC powers
Fig. 10.7 Hierarchy event tree
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RCW and RSW pumps) and the loss of its function, and then LUHS occurs.
Also, inundation into the R/B causes the flooding of RCIC control panel and the
loss of RCIC function. Then all of the water injection function failure is
occurred.
3. Tsunami height exceeding T.P. 18 m
Because, as shown by the fragility analysis result, the watertight door of C/B is
broken by tsunami of this height, inundation into the C/B occurs, and it causes
the loss of DC power (TBD).
Tsunami PRA result at the state after the implementation of countermeasures is
shown in Fig. 10.8. Total CDF is calculated as 1.0E-7(/RY) in average value. As for
accident sequence rate, TBD is dominant sequence accounting for 74 percentages in
total CDF.
10.4 Effectiveness Evaluation About the Measure Taken
in the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant
The validity of the measures against tsunami and power supply reflecting the lessons
learned from the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident will be evaluated by using the
tsunami PRA. Here, the validity for the implemented safety measures is qualitatively







TBD: Transient with loss of all AC & DC powers
TBU: Transient with loss of all AC powers and ECCS(RCIC) injections
TB: Transient with loss of decay heat removal
Fig. 10.8 Contribution of each accident sequences for CDF in tsunami PRA (the state after the
implementation of tsunami countermeasures)
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sequences determined prior to the implementation of additional safety countermea-
sures. Regarding TQUV, probability of LUHS and possibility of inoperability of
RCIC by submersion will decrease due to installation of embankment, tidal wall, and
watertight doors for important equipment rooms such as RCIC room and modifica-
tion for maintenance hatch in T/B. Furthermore, even though all low-pressure water
injection systems are lost by tsunami exceeding the embankment height, water
injection can be done by fire engines located at high elevations. Therefore, in the
state after the implementation of the tsunami countermeasures, it can be presumed
that the occurrence probability of TQUV is reduced substantially. As for TBD,
probability of LOOP and inoperable possibility of DC power by submersion will
also decrease due to installation of embankment and watertight doors of important
equipment rooms. In addition, the enhancement of DC power supplies is
implemented for storage battery extension at higher floor in the reactor building,
additional established storage battery, installation of the small generator, and main-
tenance of the DC power supply means. Accordingly, it is presumed that the
possibility of loss of DC power decreases. Therefore, the present measures can be
presumed as being appropriate against the important accident sequences extracted.
10.5 Conclusion
Tsunami PRA studies for Unit 7 of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS was conducted, and the
dominant accident scenarios that may result in core damage due to flooding were
identified. The important accident sequences were evaluated as TQUV and TBD at
the state before the implementation of countermeasures and CDF calculated as 2.1E-
4 (/RY). This information supports qualitative assessment of the countermeasures
that have been and will be implemented which indicates that these accident sequence
probabilities will be decreased. Hence, the tsunami PRAwas performed with the state
after the implementation of tsunami countermeasures and CDF is calculated as 1.0E-
7(/RY). By comparing these two CDFs, the effectiveness of the tsunami counter-
measures which are implemented in the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS is confirmed.
In this evaluation, there are some conservative assumptions, and total CDF is
evaluated conservatively. However, for the purpose of safety enhancement, PRA
should be implemented with more realistic method not to hide important sequences
and equipment. With an emphasis on a sequence whose CDF is large, if the
evaluation is impractical, there is a possibility that determination of safety measures
will not be proper.
For example, countermeasures undetermined at that time of the PRA model
design, such as waterproof treatment against internal flooding and drainage pumps,
are not considered in the present evaluation. As a result, if outside watertight doors
are broken due to wave pressure, the equipment in buildings is flooded and
damaged according to the flooding depth. For the next step, more detail flooding
propagation analyses in buildings with information of additional countermeasures
are needed. The insights of inner flooding analysis will be also available. TEPCO
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will try to improve tsunami PRA continuously and enhance safety of the
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS using such results.
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